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The Influence of Organized American Business on Public Policy in the European Union:  The 
Transition from Outsider to Insider 
 
  After the Second World War and through the 1970's and early 1980's, American corporations were 
excluded from many European business interest associations (BIAs). State officials and European 
business leaders alike seemed determined to keep American business out of any important role in the 
development of the European Community. Yet, by the 1990's, American business had become one of 
the most influential policy actors in Europe. This is especially evident in the impressive organizational 
infrastructure and policy capability of the E.C. Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Brussels (AMCHAM-ECC). 
  Why did this happen? There are various possible explanations for the policy effectiveness of 
American business in the face of European opposition. Although most of these explanations contribute 
to an understanding of this phenomenon, I will argue that the development of the structures of the EC 
institutions themselves and their compatibility with the political organization and experience of 
American business provide the most convincing answer. 
  The public policy implications of the structures of the EC have been outlined clearly by Wolfgang 
Streeck and Philippe Schmitter. ' They argue that the EC now has "an American-style pattern of 
'disjointed pluralism' or 'competitive federalism'..." Thus, American business feels right at home in a 
political sense. 
  At the same time, American BIAs have a number of characteristics that suit the EC institutional 
environment. American firms contribute large resources to their lobbying efforts and have a habit of 
multi-lateral thrusts. Their BIAs have shown themselves highly resilient and adaptable to changing 
circumstances. They have looked upon the European market as one market rather than viewing Europe 
as one home country attempting to penetrate eleven others. In a sense they are often more European 
than the Europeans. They have moved quickly to staff their BIAs with Europeans or Americans with a 
substantial European education. 
  The analysis of this argument will be based on data collected from American Euro-business 
associations and large American corporations. Clearly, this research has an actor-centred approach. 
How American business explains its own policy success will be at the forefront of this analysis. 
 
 
The Public Policy Characteristics of the European Union 
 
 
  The central argument of this research is that public policy-making in Europe has developed a 
number of characteristics that are compatible with increased political influence for American business. One of the first characteristics of the Europeification of modem public policy-making is its increasing 
complexity. Second, the policy system process is constantly changing. Third, the number of policy 
actors is increasing. 
  In contrast to national systems of policy-making, the system at the European Union (EU) level is 
complex. It is a mixture of the liberal/pluralist tradition of Anglo-Saxon based polities, the corporatist 
traditions of Northern Europe, and systems that attempt to combine both parliamentary/pluralist and 
bureaucratic/corporatist traditions. It is not clear what interests are legitimate and for any interest 
which some see as legitimate, the mandate of any particular organization to speak for and represent 
that stable legitimate interest is open to dispute. In addition, there are many new interests,, often 
crosscutting and all with an unclear issue agenda.2 
  The nature of the public policy process in Europe is constantly changing as well. The evolution is 
rapid, uneven and unpredictable. No one knows what type of policy process will emerge in some 
period of stability that is bound to emerge. Yet, for the present, constant evolution is the only certainty 
and the definitive mature process cannot yet be deciphered.3 
  Third, the number of policy actors is increasing. Interest groups and particularly business interest 
associations have increased over tenfold over the past 25 years? The spontaneous uncontrolled growth 
of policy actors marks the typical pluralist form of policy-making. 
  While there are many other characteristics of the public policy process of The European Union, 
the three characteristics mentioned above seem most relevant to understanding how American business 
as an outsider was able to migrate to a basically insider role within 20 years. The pluralistic turbulence 
of the EU policy community was fertile ground for American efforts to shape European policy to their 
liking. The increasing complexity and the constant changing of the rules could not help but benefit 
organizations nurtured in such an environment at home. 
 
 
An Actor-centered Approach 
 
 
  The goal of this paper is to understand how American business was able to manage the transition 
from outsider to insider in the European public policy process. The approach to be used is one that sees 
the obstacles and opportunities through the eyes of American business itself. How did American 
business organize itself and in what ways? The approach is an actor-centered one with American 
business as the actor. 
  In the context of this research the American business actor-centered approach can be contrasted 
with alternative possible paths of explanation. For example, we will not consider some calculation of 
overriding national interests or the rules of the European public policy game as leading to an 
appropriate explanation. Thus, we do not see American business as some "object" of historical 
processes. As well we reject the overwhelming importance of ideas, ideologies or laws, as well as 
economic or cultural determinism. 
  In particular our approach turns our attention towards the specific political forms of organization 
adopted by American business and its characteristics of concentration and coordination. We ask what 
are the forms of structural interpenetration between the fora of the European Union and American 
business? What we want to know is to what extent should we attribute to American business the 
adoption of self-conscious strategies and tactics to break their way into the centres of European 
decision-making. 
  Understanding actual collective action and behaviour is crucial. In particular, this method of 
political analysis requires a close, detailed micropolitical examination of actual choices Ideology and 
its explication is not enough. There are a number of significant dimensions here. 
  First, what has American business considered as the strategic organizational and policy 
options over the recent past? In looking at these possible alternatives, American business was faced 
with two basic possibilities. It could act as if it were an outsider or foreigner. In such a role its policies 
would be reactive and its stance towards European public policy would be as a policy-taker. The 
American business firm would rely on commercial decisions to achieve success in the modem Europe. 
  In contrast, American business took the position that firms headquartered in the U.S. 
were not policy outsiders. They took the stance that through their European investments they 
had a stake in European Union public policy. Initially they began by emphasizing their investment advantages to national governments where these involvements already existed. Rather than 
having American officials defend these investments, American business looked to domestic European 
officials. After all, these investments created European jobs, and they paid European taxes and 
transferred American technology to Europe. To ignore The policy interests of American firms would 
be unfair and unwise for all concerned. Above all American firms tried to argue from a position of 
strength, namely by cultivating an image as a good corporate citizen in Europe. 
  The choice of such a strategy was not difficult. This was exactly the same type of advice that 
American business gave their European counterparts at home. Underlying this strategy at home and 
abroad was the proposition that business investment always confers public policy and citizenship 
rights.6 
  Second, what did American business see as the significant limitations and opportunities in 
pursuing its strategy as an active influence of European public policy? The major constraint was in 
clear view to all, American business was American, and as such it needed to shed its alien face and 
compensate for its exclusion from the privileged access of European firms. Its major advantage, on the 
other hand, was its lack of national identification with one European country and thus its playing field 
was level although low throughout Europe as a whole. 
  Third, how did American business assess the benefits and costs of the various possible behaviours 
open to them as they pursued their pan-European investment image while downplaying their 
Americanness by projecting themselves as good European citizens? One might have expected the large 
American firms to act as free booters, that is, an enterprise that feels that its resources, knowledge, 
political connections and market power allows it to defend and promote itself without the help of 
interest associations.7 This attitudinal stance by American business at home has been noted by Graham 
Wilson. 8 
  Yet faced with a politically hostile environment in the 1960s, a choice was made to follow a 
collective course of action. The core of this collective strategy was the development and utilization of 
the already existing complex web of The American Chamber of Commerce and its international 
network. On the domestic side the coordinating body is the United States Council for International 
Business in New York City. One of its units coordinates the European effort of the Council, namely 
the United States Industry Coordinating Group on European  
Community Affairs (USICG). This Group, in turn, coordinates the work of the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), the Washington office of the domestic US Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM), and the National Foreign Trade Council on the American side of the Atlantic with the 
EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels (AMCHAM-ECC). 
  In 1963 a choice was made by American business to organize collectively in Europe with Paris as 
its headquarters. The original organization was called the Council of American Chambers of 
Commerce in Europe. Later it changed its name to the Council of American Chambers of Commerce-
Europe and Mediterranean. Now it is known as the European Council of American Chambers of 
Commerce (ECACC). 
  From the beginning its primary goal was to coordinate the policy position of the various American 
Chambers of Commerce in various European countries such as the ones in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and the UK with the U.S. Chamber 
back home in Washington. Its main tactic for putting their coordinating positions into effect was to 
find European interest groups that shared the same policy position. Over time the ECACC found itself 
delegating more and more responsibilities to the EC Committee of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Brussels. In time AMCHAM-ECC became more and more the lead policy organization 
because of its strategic political location. This was similar to the transference of business public policy 
leadership in the United States from the corporate capital of New York to the political capital of 
Washington. Originally, AMCHAM-ECC was only a very small committee of the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Belgium. 
  AMCHAM-ECC was started in 1965. With a full-time staff of approximately twenty people it 
represents over 600 corporations of American parentage. Especially important in its policy 
communications are the research and policy publications which often are used by EU decision-makers 
in the drafting of official documents? So effective had this collective effort become by the 1980s that 
Japanese corporations in Europe decided to model their political action on the American business 
model. 10   Thus, American business clearly opted for organized, collective action. The fear of discordant 
policy voices in a politically hostile environment ruled out a free booter strategy. Policy coordination 
was critical. As these coordinating efforts proceeded the locus of effort moved from Washington in the 
1950s to Paris in the 1960s and finally to Brussels. American business increasingly spoke with one 
voice and got closer and closer to the seat of European Union policy-making authority. 
  Yet in order to coordinate effectively so many American corporations over such wide 
geographical area in both Europe and America required a careful blend of incentives and tactics. What 
inducements did these collective organizations have to offer their various members in order to bring 
about such effective coordination? On the other hand, what tactics did these organizations have to use 
in order to influence their major policy interlocutors, the EU policy, the EU member states, and the 
major European business interest associations (BIAs)? 
  The first problem of policy coordination was met in two ways. First, the complex net of the 
American Chamber of Commerce system pulled together the various business associations. This was 
especially critical in the case of the Chamber units in the individual member states. 
  The second dimension of public policy confrontation involves the blending together of the specific 
public affairs offices and activities of the American firms in Europe. The European operations of 
American corporations, their European staff and their American consultants in Brussels have 
considerable autonomy from the company headquarters in the United States. Partially this is the result 
of geography, but American corporate officials generally recognize that European laws, business 
practices and industrial relations differ significantly from domestic pattens and that it is best to have 
European officers make decisions on the spot. 
  The basic decision made is that collective action is more efficacious than firm-led initiatives. The 
first place to begin collective action is AMCHAM-ECC. What incentives does it have to offer? 
  AMCHAMM-ECC offers goods that we may define as both public and categoric. These include 
the channelling of information or assistance to state organizations such as the European Parliament and 
the political groups within it11, the European Commission, the directorates general (DG), the Council 
of Ministers and the Economic and Social committee (ESC). As well, these goods include the 
standardization of products and services or as is also known, harmonization across EU member states. 
  One organizational problem for AMCHAM-ECC is that any success it has in these areas cannot be 
denied to nonmembers. This, of course, is the classic free rider problem. Mitigating against this is the 
lack of alternatives for American firms. By themselves they would find it sometimes difficult to 
influence EU policy-making. They are excluded from such powerful groups as the European Round 
Table of Industrialists (ERT). In addition any standardization or harmonization decisions may 
disadvantage the free rider firm's products or services in the absence of AMCHAM-ECC 
representation. 12 
  AMCHAM-ECC develops its representations in working subcommittees which are composed of 
American corporate officials. One of these is selected to compose a draft position paper and then the 
draft is circulated among the subcommittee members for changes, additions and deletions. The author 
is then expected to write a second draft which once again circulates among the subcommittee members. 
If the subcommittee is more or less happy with the revised draft, it now goes to the full EC committee 
for examination. If the draft passes this stage it is then sent on to all members of the European 
Commission and top-level officials of the DGs plus other possibly influential officials in the EU. 
  On the other hand, AMCHAM-ECC has important resources to influence its interlocutors in the 
EU officialdom. The high technical quality of AMCHAM-ECC position papers means that EU 
officials pay careful attention to their substance. This emphasis on high quality technical research is a 
trait carried over from Washington politics. The information, generalizations and recommendations 
often find their way into EU proposals and regulations. 13 
  AMCHAM-ECC is effective because it recognizes it must get in early on any policy question, 
indeed it recognizes that it needs to help set the agenda of the EU itself. This is easier at the EU level 
than at the member state level because there are a broader range of public policies and policy choices 
available. Thus, this more open field gives American corporations more freedom to influence EU 
public policy. With the fragmentation of public policy authority comes policy opportunities. Closed 
questions at the member state level' become open questions at the EU level. More policy alternatives 
are possible? 
  American corporations do not forget another important set of interlocutors, the Council of 
Ministers and the member EU states. They are especially useful to American firms when their policy goal is primarily to stop EU decision-making in a policy area. These firms are careful to point out their 
national investment and the jobs created. Also, their influence often 
is amplified by membership in national BIAs. 15 
  The fifth and final dimension of the actor-centered approach that we will consider here is how 
American business in Europe responded to the consequences that flowed from the public policy 
choices that it made at various times. Some of these consequences were anticipated because they were 
intended or at least expected. However, some of the impacts of these choices were neither intended or 
expected, and when they were negative, these strategies necessitated an adaptation. 
  American business and AMCHAM-ECC have been especially effective in affecting EU technical 
standards. This is because they have been able to develop integrated, cohesive positions across all EU 
member states and as well they have generally been able to define harmonization issues as merely 
technical and not political. In general, when national standards clashed, the Americans argued in 
favour of the lowest national standard often in the guise of mutual recognition.16 They viewed the race 
to the bottom as generally favorable to U.S. business interests. 
  We can see a change in political strategy when the usual collective action doesn't produce the 
hoped for results. The colorful battle over EU banana imports is an interesting case. In this fruit 
subsector, deregulation and open markets, that is no banana standard, favour American companies. 
However, after 1992, standards in the guise of quotas and tariffs were raised. These raised barriers 
penalized American sources in Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador and 
Brazil. At the same time, they privileged commercial interests in Britain, Italy, France, Portugal and 
Spain. These interests have ties to former colonies and protectorates in Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, the 
Windward Islands, Sorealia, Camcroon and the Ivory Coast, as well as EU overseas territories such as 
Guadeloupe, Martinique, Madeira and the Canary Islands. 
  The consumers of Northern continental Europe were the big losers, especially Germany, but also 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. American f'irms joined an ad hoc Alliance 17 with the 
German Fruit Importers and Wholesalers Association, an organization with approximately 550 firms, 
and its large affiliate, the Bavarian Fruit Importers and Wholesalers. Nonetheless, their combined 
efforts failed. 
  At this point, Dole Food Company Incorporated and Chiquita Brands International 
Incorporated began vigorous individual corporate action. As the two main traditional suppliers to 
Northern Europe, they were especially hurt by the increased common barriers to trade. They turned to 
U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor and asked him to threaten the use of trade sanctions if the 
barriers to American banana imports were not softened.18 Clearly, this is a highly unusual tactic and is 
only invoked when usual collective action fails. 
 
 
Success and Limitations 
 
 
  Certainly there are many reasons for the public policy success of American business. The 
compatibility of American institutional culture with EU institutions plus American experiences in 
pluralist collective organizations is only part of the story albeit an important part. The U.S. experience 
is a large, regionally diverse market also stands American business in good stead. U.S. firms have a 
long history of accommodation to a large domestic market, which despite its regional diversity, is both 
accessible and familiar. 19 
  The ability of organizations to organize effectively along the spatial dimension is one of the most 
important resources an organization can have. In the U.S. case, market-building has been going on for 
over 200 years as American business has attempted to create a highly integrated national economy in 
the face of subnational, cultural, regional and economic barriers. American firms have expanded freely 
to capture markets throughout the U.S. These firms have used constitutional rule-changing to break 
clown subnational barriers. From the Articles of Confederation to the initial drafting of The U.S. 
Constitution, and as amended by the legal consequences of the American Civil War and Supreme 
Court decisions, the American central government has been used to develop a pan-American 
commercial focus. This same stance has merely been transported by American business to Europe in 
form of its collective action and public policy positions.   Figure 1 provides some overall visual context for the two dimensions of politics and markets. 
They are presented as orthogonal to each other and thus produce different types of cases in the four 
quadrants. Case 1 represents a loose system which some aspire to as an integrated system, such as 
Europe between the two world wars of the twentieth century, yet for the most part, markets were 
Balkanized and politics was decentralized along national lines. Case 2 is one of two intermediate cases. 
Because of constitutional interpretations, judicial decisions and conventions together with concentrated 
ethnic and religious loyalties based on long-standing historical regional identities, the would-be 
integrated political system remains decentralized and regionalized, yet market forces are responding to 
a logic of business production that favours those firms that expand their market reach.20 
 
********************************************************************* 
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  Case 3, also an intermediate case, is the mirror image of the previous situation. Because of 
historical political experiences usually because of a long-term military campaign, the central organs of 
state in the political system have become strongly centralized yet production of goods and services and 
sometimes consumption continue older patterns of regional markets. Business historically has 
developed informal regional arrangements and pacts that bring order to production, labour, wholesale 
and retail markets despite a strong political centre. Business and politics in Spain seem to fit this 
pattern.21 
  Finally, Case 4 represents the end state of market and political centralization. How a system gets 
to this end state may vary. In the case of the United States, the markets followed centralizing political 
institutions. If the EU follows the same path, then the political institutions seem to be following the 
lead of large business as organized domestically in the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), 
22 the AMCHAM-ECC for U.S. business and the Electronics Industry of Japan Association (EIJA)or 
the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (/AMA) in the case of Japanese business.23 
  In examining the success of organized American business in Europe we need to note two major 
problem areas for these firms. First, American companies do not understand well or feel comfortable 
with European industrial relations, especially Continental ones. Rather than adjusting to European 
traditions in this area, they have tried to get the EU to adopt the American tradition of employer 
supremacy, a chronic battle these American firms have clearly lost.24 
  Second, American firms prefer EU corporate law, management principles and the definition of 
shareholder rights to be based on the common law traditions of the Anglo-Saxon countries rather than 
Continental Europe's civil code and Germanic boardroom practices. American corporate managers 
prefer rules that make corporate takeovers easy and increase the influence of shareholders in day-to-
day operations of corporations. In general, American business has lost this battle. As in the case of 
industrial relations, the limitations on American political success are cultural, not ones based on 
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